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 INTRODUCTION
On 21st October 2008, the State, Society 
& Governance in Melanesia Program held a 
workshop entitled Courts and Coups; Fiji’s 
October 2008 High Court Judgment in the 
Qarase v Bainimarama Case. This brought 
together George Williams, the Anthony 
Mason Professor in the Faculty of Law at 
the University of New South Wales, Graham 
Leung, the Managing Partner of Howards 
Lawyers in Suva, as well as Anthony Regan 
and Jon Fraenkel from the State, Society 
& Governance in Melanesia Program at 
ANU. The meeting was chaired by Duncan 
Kerr, Australia’s Parliamentary Secretary for 
Pacific Affairs.
The objective of the workshop was to 
discuss a judgment by Fiji’s High Court 
on 9th October 2008 which found that the 
President’s actions in appointing an interim 
cabinet in January 2007, and in continuing to 
rule by decree in the wake of Fiji’s December 
5th 2006 coup, ‘were valid and are held to 
be lawful’. The judges declared that Fiji’s 
President held certain ‘prerogative powers’ 
not provided for in the constitution, and that 
‘exceptional circumstances existed’ because 
‘the stability of the State was endangered’. 
The decision effectively legitimised the interim 
government that had emerged in the wake of 
Fiji’s December 5 2006 military coup. 
In the first of the four papers included 
here, Professor George Williams, who 
served as Counsel in the 2001 Chandrika 
Prasad case - which ruled the government 
that arose after Fiji’s 2000 coup to be illegal 
-  discusses the precedents set by that earlier 
case, and how these were dealt with by the 
Fiji judges in 2008. In the second paper, 
Graham Leung, a lawyer who practises in Fiji 
and was formerly Chairman of the Electoral 
Commission, discusses the changing role 
of the judiciary in Fiji. In the third paper, 
Anthony Regan considers whether the 2008 
Fiji Court ruling was, as it claimed to be, a 
purposive interpretation of Fiji’s constitution, 
and examines the scope for presidential 
exercise of prerogative powers granted by 
the 1997 constitution. In the final paper, Jon 
Fraenkel examines the political context of the 
2008 judgment and its likely consequences.  
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QARASE v BAINIMARAMA AND 
THE RULE OF LAW IN FIJI   
George Williams
On 29 May 2000, the Commander of the 
Fiji Military Forces issued a decree abrogating 
the 1997 Fijian Constitution (the Constitution). 
Nine months later on 1 March 2001, the 
Court of Appeal of Fiji in Republic of Fiji v 
Prasad upheld an earlier High Court decision 
that the 1997 Fiji Constitution remained in 
force as the supreme law of Fiji. Immediately 
after the decision, the Prime Minister of 
the Interim Civilian Government, which had 
been installed by the Fiji Military Forces, 
stated that the nation would be returned to 
democratic rule under the Constitution. 
These events, centring upon the decision 
of the Court of Appeal, were an important 
landmark in the history of the common law. It 
was the first, and so far as I am aware the still 
the only, time that the leaders of a coup d’etât 
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of a 
court only months after a takeover. It is also 
the first time that a court decision restored a 
Constitution, and the democratic system of 
government created by it. By contrast, the 
October 2008 High Court of Fiji judgment in 
Qarase v Bainimarama gave legal recognition 
to an otherwise unlawful usurper.
Necessity and Effectiveness and the 
Prasad Litigation
When asked to determine the legality of a 
coup or coup-like events, courts usually use 
one of two alternative analytical methods, 
called necessity and effectiveness. There 
is no reference to either doctrine in the text 
of the 1997 Fiji Constitution, but, as in other 
constitutional systems (see, for example, 
Attorney-General v Ibrahim 1964), the 
necessity doctrine at least was seen by the 
Fijian courts in Prasad as being necessarily 
implied into the instrument as a means of 
ensuring its preservation.
Courts have recognised a principle of 
necessity that dictates that, in times of extreme 
crisis, emergency action may validly be taken 
that would otherwise be illegal. Such action, 
including a declaration of martial law, must 
be a transient and proportionate response to 
the crisis. It may be invoked only to uphold 
the rule of law and the existing legal order, 
and, therefore, cannot be applied to uphold 
the legality of a new revolutionary regime. 
The latter can only be achieved under the 
doctrine of ‘effectiveness’. According to FM 
Brookfield, a leading writer in this field:
the power of a Head of State under a 
written Constitution extends by implication 
to executive acts, and also to legislative 
acts taken temporarily (that is, until 
confirmed, varied or disallowed by the 
lawful Legislature) to preserve or restore the 
Constitution, even though the Constitution 
itself contains no express warrant for them. 
(Brookfield, 1988, p. 47).
This construction of the necessity doctrine 
is consistent with decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan (Bhutto v Chief of Army 
Staff 1977 p. 723, 728, 753; Zafar Ali Shah 
v Pervez Musharraf 2000 p.1160-1161 per 
Irshad Hasan Khan CJ), where it has been 
held that emergency action cannot be taken 
under the principle of necessity in order to 
subvert the existing constitutional structure 
(See also Texas v White, 1862 p.733 per 
Chase CJ; Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke 
1968 p. 441 per Fieldsend AJA; Mokotso v 
HM King Moshoeshow II 1989 p. 122 per 
Cullinan CJ). Hence, the doctrine cannot 
authorise the abrogation of the existing legal 
order, only its temporary suspension.
In the context of the 2000 coup in Fiji, the 
necessity doctrine was applied by Justice 
Gates of the High Court (in Prasad v Republic 
of Fiji 2001 p.665) to find that actions of the 
President of Fiji and the Commander of the 
Fijian Military could be regarded as lawful 
insofar as they were designed to resolve 
the hostage crisis and to uphold the 1997 
Constitution. Justice Gates’ preparedness 
to apply the doctrine was based upon his 
finding that there had been no genuine desire 
on the part of the Commander to abrogate 
the 1997 Constitution:
Commodore Bainimarama is clearly no 
usurper. Having acted as he thought best 
in a temporary but dire hostage crisis, he 
handed over power to a civilian caretaker 
administration. Necessity would permit him 
to suspend the Constitution just for so long 
as to allow him to free the hostages and to 
restore law and order. That concluded his 
role.
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Gates ordered that ‘[t]he revocation of the 
1997 Constitution was not made within the 
doctrine of necessity and such revocation 
was unconstitutional and of no effect’ and 
‘[t]he Parliament of Fiji, consisting of the 
President, the Senate, and the House of 
Representatives, is still in being.’ He stated 
that ‘the military is invited and recommended 
by the court to ensure a smooth and amicable 
hand over of Government to that which 
will soon be chosen by the incoming Prime 
Minister’.
By contrast, under the effectiveness 
doctrine a court exercises a supra-
constitutional jurisdiction in determining 
whether a revolution or coup ought to be 
given legal recognition in place of the deposed 
political order. The idea is that if a coup is 
effective, it ought to be given recognition on 
the basis that there is no practical point in 
doing otherwise. One test for determining 
effectiveness was set out by Cullinan CJ of 
the High Court of Lesotho in Mokotso v HM 
King Moshoeshow II (1989 p. 133):
A court may hold a revolutionary government 
to be lawful, and its acts to have been 
legitimated ab initio, where it is satisfied 
that (a) the government is firmly established, 
there being no other government in 
opposition thereto; and (b) the government’s 
administration is effective, in that the 
majority of the people are behaving, by and 
large, in conformity therewith.
In the earlier decision of Mitchell v Director 
of Public Prosecutions (1986 p. 72), Haynes 
P of the Court of Appeal of Grenada, included 
two further elements:
(c) such conformity and obedience [must be] 
due to popular acceptance and support and ... 
not mere tacit submission to coercion or fear 
of force; and (d) it must not appear that the 
regime was oppressive and undemocratic.
The Court of Appeal of Fiji in Republic 
of Fiji v Prasad found that the formulation 
of the effectiveness test in Mokotso was 
‘too narrowly expressed’. It was prepared to 
accept element (c) of the Mitchell test, but 
doubted the correctness of (d). While the 
Court recognised ‘the modem shift towards 
insistence on basic human rights in a raft of 
international treaties and, more importantly for 
present purposes, the 1997 Fiji Constitution’, 
it was not prepared to further extend the 
effectiveness test by adding a new criterion 
urged on behalf of Prasad, namely, whether 
the new regime acknowledges basic human 
rights as evidenced by international obligations 
assumed by the nation (Robertson, et al, 
2001p.151).
On the evidence before it, the Court 
held that the effectiveness test was not 
satisfied for two reasons. First, there was a 
rival government striving for power. Affidavits 
had been filed by former Prime Minister 
Chaudhry and by members of his Cabinet 
that claimed that the Peoples Coalition was 
‘ready and willing’ to resume office under 
the 1997 Constitution. Second, although 
the Interim Civilian Government was able to 
demonstrate the continuing operation of the 
administration of government throughout the 
attempted coup and its aftermath, this was 
insufficient to prove popular acceptance and 
support for the Interim Civilian Government. 
The Court found that ‘passive compliance 
is hardly a persuasive indication of true 
acquiescence in a government which has 
been in power for only about seven months 
and severely restricts public protest’.
The Decision in Qarase v Bainimarama
This case arose out of the December 
2006 military take-over of Fiji. The previous 
18 months had been characterised by 
increasing ill-will and conflict between the 
Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) and 
Government of Prime Minister Laisenia 
Qarase over matters such as:
the 2000 coup and the Reconciliation •	
Tolerance and Unity Bill;
an investigation into the actions of the •	
Military Commander, Commodore 
Bainimarama; 
the RFMF seeking the termination of the •	
contract of the Commissioner of Police; 
and
the RFMF stating the greatest threat to •	
Fiji’s national and economic security was 
the ‘lack of good governance under the 
present cloak of democracy’.
On 5 December 2006 the RFMF took 
control of the streets of Suva. That evening, 
an Extraordinary Fiji Gazette notice was 
issued in which the Commander stated that:
At approximately 1800 hours tonight Tuesday 
5th December 2006 I have with much 
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reluctance assumed executive authority of 
the country and henceforth declared a State 
of Emergency.
The Commander dismissed the Prime 
Minister and the rest of the Fijian Government 
and appointed Dr Jona Baravilala Senilagakali 
as Caretaker Prime Minister to advise the 
dissolution of Parliament.
On 4 January 2007 Mr Senilagakali 
tendered his resignation as Caretaker Prime 
Minister. That day, the Commander handed 
back executive power to the President of Fiji, 
Ratu Josefa Iloilo Uluivuda, who endorsed 
the actions of the Commander and the RFMF 
‘in acting in the interest of the nation and most 
importantly in upholding the Constitution’.
On 5 January 2007 the President appointed 
an interim government with the Commander 
as Interim Prime Minister. He also:
ratified the dismissal of the Prime Minister, •	
Cabinet and the Ministers of State, the 
appointment of a Caretaker Prime Minister 
and the dissolution of Parliament.
promulgated an unconditional grant of •	
immunity to the Commander, the Caretaker 
Prime Minister, all officers and members of 
the RFMF and the other branches of the 
disciplined services; and
provided for legislation to be made by •	
decree.
The key question for the High Court 
bench of Acting Chief Justice Gates and 
Judges Byrne and Pathik was the validity 
of these acts by the President. The Court 
handed down a unanimous judgment on 9 
October 2008 that sidestepped the necessity 
and effectiveness doctrines. 
The Court held that all of the acts by 
the President occurred consistently with the 
1997 Fiji Constitution. This was based on 
the giant legal fiction that the Constitution 
could accommodate such extraordinary 
undemocratic acts without itself being 
compromised. In effect, the Court held that 
there had been no coup. 
The Court reached its conclusions based 
upon a reading of the prerogative powers 
of the President. These powers derived 
originally from the ancient rights of the British 
Crown, and have been held over time in other 
nations by representatives of the Crown 
such as the Governor General of Australia. 
The Court did not examine how this power 
had come to survive the transition of Fiji 
into a republic, let alone the codification of 
the powers of the President of Fiji in the 
Constitution (which does not include any 
mention of the prerogative powers). 
Nevertheless, the Court found that 
the President of Fiji had inherited powers 
including:
the power to wage foreign wars, to make 
treaties, to defend the realm, to grant honours, 
to preserve the State from civil strife, and to 
act in an emergency to ensure the well-being 
and safety of the people. [emphasis added]
The Court recognised that prerogative 
powers remain only if not ‘superseded 
by statute, eroded by judicial decision or 
atrophied by neglect or disuse’. It found that 
these powers had not been displaced by the 
Constitution.
On this basis, the Court upheld the actions 
of the President:
The President’s decision in short was to 
exercise prerogative powers to rule directly 
until suitable elections could be conducted 
… The details of how all of this was to be 
achieved did not affect or deflect from the 
President’s clear intention to act to save the 
country from its strife, or affect the legality 
of his acts within the scope of the ultimate 
reserve powers.
Therefore, the Court held:
We also do not find that the President’s 
actions consolidated any revolution. The 
Constitution remained and remains intact.
It also went onto say, in a statement 
that could not have been reached using the 
necessity doctrine (which would have only 
allowed such extraordinary action, if at all, for 
a strictly limited time):
we do not find it appropriate to issue 
directions as to a definite timetable for the 
holding of elections. No doubt the President 
will have uppermost in his mind the twin 
imperatives of the sanctity of fair elections 
on the one hand and the need for urgent 
return to democratic rule on the other.
Critique
The decision of the High Court of Qarase 
v Bainimarama can be criticised on four main 
grounds. First, reliance upon the prerogative 
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powers of the President to support actions 
such as the dismissal of the Prime Minister 
and rule by decree cannot be sustained. One 
of the central problems with the judgment 
is that it does not even make the case as 
to how the prerogative power can still exist 
in Fiji. The prerogative normally describes 
certain powers held by the monarch or her 
representatives in a nation that has not yet 
become a republic. It is possible that such 
powers may have survived the transition to 
a republic in Fiji, but this is by no means 
certain, and is not something that has been 
made out in the judgment. 
Even if the prerogative has survived in 
Fiji, one of the most basic rules governing 
the prerogative is that it can be displaced 
by other law. Where Fijian statute law or 
the Constitution is inconsistent with any 
prerogative power, the prerogative power 
cannot be used. This is clearly the case with 
regard to some exercises of the prerogative 
powers identified as lawful by the High Court. 
For example, section 96 of the Constitution 
provides that the president must only act on 
advice, subject to certain express exceptions. 
One of these exceptions is the explicit 
circumstances set out in the Constitution in 
which the president may dismiss a prime 
minister. The president ‘may not’ dismiss a 
prime minister except in the circumstances 
set out in s 109 of the Constitution:
Dismissal of Prime Minister
109.(1) The President may not dismiss a 
Prime Minister unless the Government fails 
to get or loses the confidence of the House of 
Representatives and the Prime Minister does 
not resign or get a dissolution of the Parliament.
Remarkably, the High Court recognised 
that the dismissal of the prime minister and 
other actions had not been carried out in 
compliance with the Constitution:
The dismissal of Mr Qarase as Prime Minister, 
the dismissal of the Cabinet, the appointment 
of a Caretaker Prime Minister to advise on 
the dissolution, and the dissolution itself, 
were not carried out in compliance with the 
above sections.
This should have been a very straight 
forward answer to any suggestion that the 
prerogative could be relied upon. It is unheard 
of for the prerogative to give power to a 
president that can be exercised contrary to a 
fundamental law such as the Constitution.
The anomaly is made even more stark by 
the fact that the Constitution also provides 
in detail in Chapter 14 for the exercise of 
‘Emergency Powers’ by the President. For 
example, 
Emergency powers
187.-(1) The Parliament may make a law 
conferring power on the President, acting on 
the advice of the Cabinet, to proclaim a state 
of emergency in Fiji, or in a part of Fiji, in 
such circumstances as the law prescribes.
(2) The law may include provisions 
conferring on the President the power to 
make regulations relating to the state of 
emergency. 
…
Summoning of House of Representatives
188.-(1) Upon the proclamation, of a state of 
emergency, the President must summon the 
House of Representatives to meet. 
 ….
Powers of House of Representatives
189.-(1) The House of Representatives may, 
at any time, disallow a proclamation of a 
state of emergency. 
Second, the decision of the High Court 
furthers the possibility of there being an 
ongoing cycle of coups in Fiji. Even if the 
military had genuine concerns about the 
Fijian Government that led to the December 
2006 takeover, the law as applied by the 
High Court provides a basis for similar action 
in the future, regardless of whether or not 
any concerns are genuine. The Court found 
that, in order for the President to act, it was 
enough that there was a political crisis. It 
was not necessary to identify the rights and 
wrongs of that crisis. Far from putting a break 
on illegal action, the High Court decision 
provides a precedent whereby the military or 
another party in Fiji may precipitate a crisis 
and then benefit from that crisis through 
ratification by the president. The decision is 
even wide enough to provide a precedent 
for similar action in other Pacific nations. 
The decision suggests that the prerogative 
power can be used to sustain future coups 
in Fiji or elsewhere in a way that suggests 
that there has been no coup at all but merely 
emergency action taken under the current 
legal order.
Third, the decision defies political reality in 
suggesting that the President could exercise 
a prerogative power appropriately in such 
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circumstances. Where the President has 
come back into office specifically in order to 
ratify what otherwise would have been the 
illegal actions of coup leaders, there are real 
questions about whether the power can be 
exercised properly and impartially.
Fourth, the decision undermines rather 
than sustains the rule of law in Fiji. One 
of the most fundamental aspects of the 
rule of law is the powers of a monarch or 
president must be checked and limited lest 
they be exercised in arbitrary circumstances. 
In this case, the powers of the President 
have been interpreted so broadly that they 
can encompass the dismissal of the Prime 
Minister, the dissolution of Parliament, rule by 
decree and a grant of immunity to those who 
took over the nation. Moreover, his powers 
have been defined in a way that there is no 
time limit to their exercise. This is in direct 
contrast to the use of other legal principles, 
such as that of necessity, which require a 
proportionate and time-limited response.
This interpretation of the prerogative 
powers is not suitable for any modern 
constitution in a democratic nation. It instead 
takes Fiji back to a time centuries ago in 
which, as recognised in the High Court 
judgment, ‘the kings of England reigned 
as absolute monarchs’. The decision in a 
clear step backwards for constitutional law, 
and the rule of law, in Fiji. The unfettered 
nature of the prerogative powers held by the 
President was explicitly recognised by the 
High Court. It found:
The Crown must be free to take whatever 
pro-active action it considers necessary for 
the protection of the State.
In effect, the Court accepted the 
submission of Commodore Bainimarama and 
the RFMF that:
the scope of the prerogative exercisable in 
a national crisis upon which the President 
drew, was necessarily expansive, malleable 
and unchecked. He said the safety of 
the nation must be within the unfettered 
control of the executive, and therefore the 
prerogative reserves to the executive a 
virtually unreviewable discretion as to what 
the national security requires.
The Court even quoted Oliver Cromwell, 
himself a usurper, who said:
If nothing should be done but what is 
according to law, the throat of the nation 
might be cut while we send for someone to 
make a law.
It is a good quote, but one that is hardly 
consistent with the rule of law.
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QARASE v BAINIMARAMA 
- THE DECISION THAT 
CONSOLIDATED A COUP 
D’ÉTAT 
Graham Leung
The long term ramifications of the Justices 
Gates, Byrne and Pathik’s decision in 
Qarase v Bainimarama are far-reaching. The 
judgment provides a strained interpretation 
of the Fiji constitution and ignores the 
underlying democratic values that underpin 
that supreme law. It will undermine the 
rule of law, democracy and parliamentary 
institutions rather than strengthen them. It is 
not just weak law, but bad law. I believe that 
the decision is bizarre and perverse. Let us 
first consider some of the background facts, 
and the sequence of events at the time of 
and in the aftermath of the 2006 coup.
On December 5th 2006, there was a 
military takeover of the government of Prime 
Minister Laisenia Qarase by the Fiji army. It 
was preceded by 18 months of ill will and 
antagonism between the military and the 
government. On the day of the coup, the 
military commander dismissed the Prime 
Minister and appointed a civilian doctor as the 
‘caretaker’ Prime Minister to advise dissolution 
of parliament. On December 6th 2006, the 
Commander ‘stepped into the shoes of the 
President’ and purported to act in that role as 
the repository of executive power, dismissing 
senior public service and ruling by decree. 
On January 4th 2007, Dr Jona Senilagakali 
tendered his resignation as ‘caretaker’ Prime 
Minister. That afternoon, the Commander 
purported to hand back executive power to 
the President, who endorsed the actions 
of the military commander ‘in acting in the 
interest of the nation and most importantly 
in upholding the Constitution’. On January 
5th 2007, the President appointed an interim 
government with the Commander as interim 
Prime Minister. He also ratified the dismissal of 
the elected Prime Minister, Laisenia Qarase, 
and his cabinet, endorsed the dissolution of 
parliament and promulgated an unconditional 
grant of immunity to the military. 
It was not the actions of the Commander 
on 5th December 2006 that were the subject 
of judicial scrutiny by Gates et al in October 
2008. It was rather the lawfulness of the 
acts of the President after his restoration on 
January 4th 2007 that were examined in that 
judgment. The court’s decision sidestepped 
the familiar necessity and effectiveness 
doctrines, which had proved decisive in the 
court cases after the previous 2000 coup (see 
George Williams article in this collection), 
and instead found that the President was 
acting in a lawful and valid fashion. 
The decision elevates the President to the 
position of a ‘super-constitutional authority’ 
accountable to no one. The rationale for 
the decision is that the President of Fiji, 
under the 1997 Constitution, allegedly has 
‘reserve powers’ that go well beyond powers 
explicitly provided for in the Constitution. 
However, these ‘prerogative powers’, which 
are held to originate from the British monarch 
should not be applied to Fiji. When Fiji 
was made a republic in September 1987 
by Sitiveni Rabuka, it also eliminated that 
link with the British Crown. Since then, 
Fiji has been a sovereign republic with its 
own written constitution. Once Fiji became 
a sovereign republic, any such residual 
powers were eliminated and the President 
became subordinate to the Constitution. The 
President’s powers are limited to what is 
contained in the Constitution. They cannot be 
enlarged in the sweeping way suggested by 
the High Court.
Nearly all of the cases cited in the Qarase 
v Bainimarama judgment relate to former 
British colonies. Most are from the pre-World 
War Two era, usually from Pakistan or India. 
In these cases, the ‘prerogative powers’ 
being discussed were those of a colonial 
Governor or Governor General either running 
the country or in the position of Head of State. 
Yet once Fiji became a sovereign democratic 
republic – as opposed to a dominion within 
the Commonwealth with the Queen as Head 
of State – the ‘prerogative powers’ that existed 
in colonial circumstances were eliminated 
and the President became subordinate to 
the Constitution (in particular, to S85 of 
the 1997 Constitution). In other words, the 
fundamental assumption in the Gates et al 
decision is erroneous.
In the 1997 constitution, the President 
of Fiji is given very specific powers, for 
example to proclaim a ‘state of emergency’ 
(see S. 187). Yet, in this and in most other 
critical cases, the President only acts ‘on 
advice’, either of the Prime Minister, his 
Cabinet or one or other member of Cabinet 
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or the Leader of the Opposition. In the Gates 
et al decision, there is talk of the head of 
state being in an ‘entirely different, special 
and singular category’. It is said that ‘no 
one has suggested His Excellency failed 
to act honestly, impartially, neutrally and in 
what he gauged to be the best interests of 
the nation, that is, of all the inhabitants of 
Fiji’ (Court of Appeal 2008). This pays little 
attention to the reality of the situation in 
contemporary Fiji, and conflicts with widely 
prevalent perceptions of the current state of 
health of Fiji’s President. The octogenarian 
president, who is 87 years of age, was in all 
probability unable to deal with complexities of 
the architecture of the post-coup Fiji situation. 
It is difficult to believe, as suggested by Gates 
et al, that he had the wherewithal to steer 
any course through the January 2007 crisis. 
There is a strong body of opinion in Fiji of the 
view that the President is a ‘military stooge’. 
Yet few people are prepared to discuss this 
because of cultural reasons, and in particular 
because of the President’s high standing as 
a traditional chief from Vuda (in Western Viti 
Levu). 
The Gates et al ruling in Qarase v 
Bainimarama made no reference to pivotal 
elements of the 1997 Constitution, which 
would normally provide vital guidance to 
judges making decisions on constitutional 
issues. In S. 3, of the 1997 constitution, it 
states,
In the interpretation of the constitution:
(a) a construction that would promote the 
purpose or object underlying the provision, 
taking into account the spirit of this 
Constitution as a whole, is to be preferred to 
a construction that would not promote that 
purpose or object; and
(b) regard must be had to the context in 
which this Constitution was drafted and to 
the intention that constitutional interpretation 
take into account social and cultural 
developments, especially:
(i) developments in the understanding of 
the content of particular human rights; 
and
(ii) developments in the promotion of 
particular human rights (Fiji Constitution 
1997 Ch. 1. S. 3). 
Yet the Gates et al judgment indicated 
no reference to, or inquiry into, the ‘context 
in which this Constitution was drafted’ or the 
‘intention’ of the framers of that fundamental 
document. Instead, it paid attention primarily 
to the ancient rights of the English sovereign. 
Justice Gates, whose decision in the 
November 2000 Chandrika Prasad case 
had won him much acclaim, has in 2006 
proved prepared to turn his earlier judgment 
on its head, and find in favour of an interim 
government that emerged as a result of a 
military coup. To respond that, had such a 
decision not been made or had the interim 
government been declared illegal, the military 
might have opted to abrogate the constitution 
is no viable defence. Judges are expected 
to act without fear or favour, and to uphold 
the rule of law, not to assess whether doing 
so might jeopardise the security situation. 
In any case, if the intention is to ‘save the 
constitution’, why was a judgment made 
back in November 2000 that upheld the 
Constitution? Back at that time, the decision 
to uphold the 1997 Constitution might equally 
have provoked a hostile response, and led 
the government to choose to abrogate that 
fundamental law. To respond differently in 
the post-2006 coup circumstances smacks 
of political bias.  
The Qarase v Bainimarama decision has 
rewarded constitutional usurpers and sends 
the wrong signal to elements in Fiji that 
are bent on taking the path of seeking 
to displace an elected government. It sets 
an unfortunate precedent especially in a 
country that has experienced four coups. 
It allows the military to provoke a crisis 
and then obtain Presidential approval for its 
actions. In the year 2000, George Speight’s 
coup failed. He was imprisoned, and is 
serving a life sentence. In the year 2006, 
Frank Bainimarama’s coup succeeded. As 
a result, he is the so-called ‘interim Prime 
Minister’. Even the schoolchildren of Fiji 
are talking about the strangeness of the 
Gates et al decision, and the contrasting 
experience after the two coups. It is very 
confusing in terms of trying to establish a 
moral compass for the nation. It shows that 
it is the victors that write the history books, 
and that if you want to mount a coup d’etat, 
you had better be sure it succeeds. The 
court’s decision has therefore caused much 
anguish, consternation and confusion. Many 
people are wondering whether the courts are 
independent any more. 
Since the Qarase v Bainimarama judgment 
there has been an attempt to muzzle free 
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speech and to halt any healthy intellectual 
discussion and critique of the High Court’s 
decision. Those who expressed views not in 
support of the judgment have been accused 
of being in ‘contempt of court’. There has 
been a tendency in some quarters in Fiji to 
suggest that judges are somehow beyond 
criticism, or that any criticism constitutes an 
‘attack on the judiciary’. Such views elevate 
judges to being synonymous with the law or, 
worse still, above it. In other jurisdictions, 
public scrutiny of court verdicts is welcomed. 
As Derek Schofield, a former Chief Justice 
of Gibraltar, has remarked; ‘it is right and 
proper that a judge’s decisions should be 
open to public and press comment and 
even criticism’ (Schofield 1999). In Ambard 
v Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago, 
it was held that ‘any man may criticize a 
decision of a court even in an outspoken 
manner’. Criticisms per se of decisions of a 
court do not amount to ‘Contempt of court’ 
as Fiji’s interim Attorney General alleges. 
On the contrary, ‘contempt of court is an 
act or omission calculated to interfere with 
the due administration of justice’ (Attorney 
General v Butterworth 1963, see also R 
v Gray 1900). The public criticism of the 
Gates et al judgment took place after the 
judges had announced their verdict. So it 
could in no sense be construed as an effort 
to interference with the administration of 
justice.  
Judges are not the law. They are not 
immune from criticism. They are not above 
the law. To try suppress dissenting views by 
suggesting that these are improper, or even 
illegal, is to stifle democratic debate about 
the basis of the Qarase v Bainimarama 
decision and its rationale. This trend tells you 
something about the worrying and accelerated 
advance towards authoritarianism in Fiji. One 
should not be surprised at the continued 
erosion of the rule of law in Fiji. It is a direct 
consequence of the extra-constitutional 
usurpation of authority by the Fiji military and 
its leaders.
The response of the ousted SDL party 
to its predicament upon removal has been 
inept. The former government has made 
serious strategic blunders and now finds itself 
on the backfoot. A reading of the judgment 
suggests that during the pre-trial conference 
stages, the solicitors for the deposed Prime 
Minister may have accepted a ‘narrowing’ 
of the issues, perhaps abandoning some 
of the original claims pleaded. There was 
perhaps too much complacency and now 
they are surprised that they have come out 
the losers. The stakes going into the Qarase 
v Bainimarama court case were huge. 
The ousted government may have under-
estimated the dangers. Now they have to 
live with the consequences. And it is hurting 
them. More importantly, it is hurting Fiji. It 
is hard to say just how much more bruising 
body blows the Constitution can put up with.
In the November 2000 Chandrika Prasad 
judgment, Justice Gates made favourable 
reference to dicta of  Fieldsend, A.J.A. in 
Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke (1969):
Nothing can encourage instability more 
than for any revolutionary movement to 
know that, if it succeeds in snatching power, 
it will be entitled ipso facto to the complete 
support of the pre-existing judiciary in their 
judicial capacity. It may be a vain hope that 
the judgment of a court will deter a usurper, 
or have the effect of restoring legality, but 
for a court to be deterred by fear of failure 
is merely to acquiesce in illegality. It may 
be that the court’s mere presence exercises 
some check on a usurper who prefers to 
avoid a confrontation with it. (High Court 
of Fiji, 2000)
In line with this interpretation of the duty of 
the Court in post-coup circumstances, Justice 
Gates at that point drew the conclusion that:
Judges should remember their oaths of 1. 
judicial office to uphold the Constitution. 
The presumption is that the Constitution 
remains unimpugned until pronounced 
otherwise in court.
Extra-constitutional occurrences or 2. 
subversions if not intended to be temporary 
will not displace the Constitution for some 
period of time. Judges should continue to 
uphold the Constitution meanwhile (Fiji 
High Court 2000).
Unfortunately, these principles were not 
again applied in the wake of the 2006 coup. 
As a result, the independence of the judiciary 
would appear to have been compromised. 
Commenting on the situation in Fiji, Sir 
Thomas Eichelbaum, a retired and respected 
Chief Justice of New Zealand (who was once 
a member both of Fiji’s Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court), has said that,
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the judiciary must never be seen to be taking 
part in matters that are properly within the 
realm of politics. I say ‘seen’ deliberately 
because even the appearance (my emphasis) 
of straying into forbidden territory is enough 
to be damaging to judicial independence. 
We all know this, yet Fiji provides a stark 
example of how easy it is for judges to 
infringe, even experienced judges, in the 
case of Fiji. The judiciary has to be heedful 
not only of external pressures but equally 
of the risk that its own conduct may be 
detrimental to judicial independence.  
When a judge of the standing of Sir 
Thomas Eichelbaum expresses sentiments 
of this kind, they are difficult to dismiss as 
those from someone with an axe to grind 
or as the ravings of a disgruntled politician 
with an agenda. It is well known that severe 
difficulties arose within the Fiji judiciary due 
to the distinct camps that arose in the 
wake of George Speight’s coup in 2000. 
Although that coup ultimately failed, within 
days the judges of the Fiji High Court had 
divided into two camps. The ‘pragmatists’ 
were led by the then Chief Justice Sir Timoci 
Tuivaga and included also Justices Michael 
Scott  and Daniel Fatiaki (who became Chief 
Justice himself upon Sir Timoci’s retirement). 
On the other side, the ‘constitutionalists’ 
were headed by Justice Anthony Gates and 
included Justices Nazhat Shameem and 
John Byrne. The pragmatists stood accused 
of assisting the military drafting its decrees. 
The constitutionalists claimed that there 
had been a serious breach of the doctrine 
of the separation of powers and that the 
pragmatists had betrayed their judicial oaths. 
It is deeply ironic that now these roles have 
been thoroughly inverted, with the former 
‘constitutionalists’ seeking to legitimize the 
post-coup interim government, and the 
former pragmatists standing up for the rule 
of law. The celebrated lawyer Geoffrey 
Robertson, who appeared as counsel for 
Chandrika Prasad in the case that ruled that 
government that emerged after Fiji’s 2000 
coup to be illegal, has recently described the 
health of Fiji’s judiciary as ‘terminal’.   
The appointment of Acting Chief Justice 
Anthony Gates was only made possible 
by the removal of Chief Justice Fatiaki 
by the military headed by Commodore 
Bainimarama, the defendant in the Qarase 
v Bainimarama decision. Yet Gates ACJ 
himself saw fit to preside over the panel 
of three judges who decided the case. 
According to the Commonwealth’s Latimer 
House principles, ‘An independent, impartial, 
honest and competent judiciary is integral 
to upholding the rule of law, engendering 
public confidence and dispensing justice.” 
(Commonwealth Principles on the Three 
Branches of Government, 2004, p 10) . 
According to the European Court of Human 
Rights, the appropriate method for establishing 
the ‘independence’ of the judiciary is with 
regard ‘to the manner of appointment of 
its members and their terms of office, the 
existence of safeguards against external 
pressures and the question of whether it 
presents an appearance of “impartiality”’ 
(Incal v Turkey, 2000). 
What then were the circumstances of 
Justice Gates’ appointment as acting Chief 
Justice? Two senior army officers facilitated 
the removal of Justice Fatiaki from the 
chambers of the Chief Justice on 3rd January 
2007. Upon his removal, Justice Shameem 
then arrogated to herself the position of 
chairmanship of the Judicial Services 
Commission, which in turn recommended to 
the President that Justice Gates be appointed 
to act as Chief Justice. The other members of 
the Judicial Services Commission were the 
chairman of the Public Service Commission, 
himself also a military appointee (after his 
predecessor had been forcibly removed by 
the army), and the President of the Fiji Law 
Society, who appeared to distance himself 
from the Commission decision.  The Law 
Society later filed proceedings challenging 
the appointment of Gates as the Acting Chief 
Justice..  
The Gates et al decision has been deeply 
damaging for Fiji, a fledgling democracy 
seeking to re-establish respect for the rule 
of law in the wake of Rabuka’s 1987 coup 
and the George Speight coup of May 2000. 
It also sets a dangerous precedent for other 
Commonwealth countries with an experience 
of coups. It has given a new lease of life to 
the myth of constitutional government in Fiji, 
despite all the flagrant constitutional breaches 
that have occurred since 5 December 2006. 
That the survival of this myth now has the 
blessing of the judiciary must have been 
cause for celebration at the military barracks. 
However, it is a “bitter pill” for advocates of 
the rule of law and democratic government.
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JUDICIAL LEGITIMISATION 
OF A COUP – PREROGATIvE 
POWERS AND THE 
‘PURPOSIvE’ APPROACH 
TO CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION
Anthony J. Regan
The October 2008 Fiji High Court decision 
in Qarase v Bainimarama1 found that the 
President of the Republic of Fiji Islands has 
extensive powers neither previously known 
nor stated in the Constitution of Fiji Islands 
(the Constitution).  In doing so the Court 
effectively ratified and legitimized the military 
coup of December 2006. 
The case involved a challenge by the 
deposed Prime Minister against the validity of 
the acts of the coup leader, the Commander 
of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF). 
The President’s unstated powers enabled him 
to retrospectively ratify both the Commander’s 
use of force in ‘stepping into the President’s 
shoes’ (p.13) and the actions taken by the 
self-appointed President in:
dismissing a Prime Minister elected in •	
accordance with the Constitution;
dismissing the Cabinet and Ministers •	
appointed in accordance with the 
Constitution; 
appointing a ‘Caretaker Prime Minister’ •	
to advise the self-appointed President 
to dissolve the constitutionally elected 
Parliament;
accepting that advice and dissolving the •	
Parliament; 
then handing back executive power to the •	
validly appointed President. 
The Court also found that upon resuming 
authority, the President validly:
appointed the RFMF Commander to be •	
‘Interim Prime Minister’, despite there 
being no such post provided for in the 
Constitution (nor there being any power 
in the Constitution for the President to 
follow such an appointment process in 
relation to the substantive office of Prime 
Minister); 
acting on the advice of the ‘Interim Prime •	
Minister’, appointed Ministers (despite 
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their not having the constitutionally 
required qualifications), so that they could 
advise the President ‘in what was to be 
a period of direct presidential rule’ (p.22) 
until fresh elections could be held;
ratified the decision of the ‘Interim Prime •	
Minister’ that in the absence of an elected 
Parliament, laws would be made by 
Promulgation, something for which there 
is no provision in the Constitution;2
promulgated ‘an unconditional grant of •	
immunity [from prosecution] … to the 
Commander, the Caretaker Prime Minister 
…, all officers and members of the RFMF 
and the other branches of the disciplined 
services’ (p.22), something done 
‘irrevocably’, through a Promulgation - ‘an 
entrenched provision in the law of Fiji, 
incapable of repeal or abrogation’ (p.23) 
- suggesting the President (acting on the 
advice of the Interim Prime Minister) had 
unilaterally amended the Constitution, the 
amendment being incapable of being 
reviewed, even by later decision of 
Parliament.
A Basis for the President’s Actions 
Outside the Constitution – Prerogative 
Powers, ‘Purposive’ Interpretation, and 
Judicial Review
The Court found that these various actions 
were authorized because the President 
had powers beyond those vested by the 
Constitution, namely prerogative powers 
- ‘the residue of discretionary or arbitrary 
authority which at any given time is left in the 
hands of the Crown’ (Dicey 1959: 424). The 
prerogative powers in question were those 
‘of defence of the realm, of national security, 
and of securing the peace, protection, and 
safety of the people’ (p.38).  The Court’s 
discussion of the extent of the authority of 
the President in the exercise of these powers 
is far from clear (pp.23-35) but seems to 
suggest that there is virtually no limit to what 
might be done. Clearly the Court regarded 
the President as empowered to step outside 
the specific requirements of the Constitution 
– indeed, to take actions contrary to those 
requirements.
Having found that prerogative powers had 
‘travelled to the colonies’ (p.33), or ‘travelled 
with the Empire’ (p.37) including to Fiji, the 
key question was whether the Constitution 
had subsequently excluded prerogative 
powers. The plaintiffs argued that no basis for 
such powers could be found in the provisions 
about the President’s powers concerning 
appointment of the Prime Minister. Almost 
entirely on the basis of what the Court saw as 
the need to ‘give a generous and purposive 
approach to the interpretation of all written 
constitutions’ (page 38), it found that the 
plaintiffs were incorrect to rely solely on a 
‘textual analysis of the Constitution’. Rather, 
if a purposive approach to interpretation 
was followed, then there was a basis for 
the ‘relevant prerogatives’ to remain. They 
were ‘the most fundamental reserve powers 
of the Head of State’, and so could not be 
abrogated without clear constitutional intent: 
‘The greater the power the clearer must be 
the form and language of the ouster’ (page 
39). 
If such remarkable extra-constitutional 
powers were not excluded, then amongst the 
main key issues were, first, determining the 
circumstances in which the President might 
be authorised to exercise those powers, and, 
seond, the extent to which such exercise 
might be questioned or reviewed by the 
courts. Unfortunately, other than some very 
broad and general statements, the decision 
says remarkably little on the former issue, 
presumably largely because of the finding 
on the latter issue, which in essence is that 
a purported exercise of prerogative power is 
not reviewable. 
On the issue of circumstances in which 
such powers can be used, the Court does 
say ‘… on grounds of extremity, gravity, and 
ensuing expediency, extraordinary powers 
are allowed to a Head of State to find a way 
out of crisis’ (p.41). In its conclusions, the 
Court found ‘that exceptional circumstances 
existed’, and that ‘no other course of action 
was reasonably available, and that such 
action as taken … was reasonably necessary 
in the interests of peace, order and good 
government’ (p.45). These findings might 
suggest that there might normally be threshold 
questions to determine, namely, namely 
whether such exceptional circumstances 
exist, and whether the actions actually taken 
are reasonable.
However, in dealing with the issue of 
reviewability, the Court found that to the extent 
that the President acted under a prerogative 
power, the exercise of that power was not 
reviewable by a court (pp.34-5). In fact ‘… in 
the absence of bad faith on the President’s 
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part as here, … the court’s inquiry cannot 
extend to whether one course of action rather 
than another might have been more suitable 
As a remedy, whether more efficacious, wiser 
or better founded’ (p.34). More generally, 
where the exercise of the prerogative was 
in relation to the subject matter of national 
security, it ‘was not amenable to the judicial 
process’ (p.34) As a result, it would appear 
that a President cannot be held accountable 
provided he or she purports to exercise a 
prerogative power in relation to matters such 
as national security. Given the elaborate 
provisions of the Constitution intended to 
ensure the accountability of the executive 
arm of government, this is a remarkable 
situation.  
The ‘Purposive Approach’ to 
Constitutional Interpretation
The comments elsewhere in this 
publication by George Williams highlight 
several arguments that clearly indicate deep 
flaws in the court’s findings about prerogative 
powers - points that do not need to be 
repeated here. Rather, I turn my attention to 
the Court’s notion of the ‘purposive approach’ 
to constitutional interpretation that is central 
to its key findings about the continued 
existence of prerogative powers despite the 
existence of a written Constitution which 
appears intended to limit powers of the Head 
of State.  
There is no doubt a strong trend in judicial 
interpretation of written constitutions to take a 
‘purposive approach’. As developed and used 
elsewhere, however, that approach involves 
rejecting the commonly used ‘literal’ or textual 
approach to statutory interpretation when 
interpreting constitutional provisions. Rather 
most courts take the view that a constitution 
should be interpreted by reference to the 
purposes of the constitution, often in part 
(at least) determined by reference to the 
intentions of the makers of the constitution. 
When using the purposive approach a court 
will usually interpret a particular provision 
by reference not only to the purpose of 
the provision in question, but also to the 
intention of the scheme of the constitution as 
a whole.  
A good example of the use of the 
approach by reference to the intention of 
the scheme of the constitution as a whole 
can be seen in the 1998 decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re 
Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R.217 
(although, in fact, the term ‘purposive 
approach’ is not used in that decision). In 
determining complex constitutional questions 
about whether or not the Canadian province 
of Quebec had rights under the Canadian 
Constitution to secede unilaterally from the 
Canadian federation, the Court rejected an 
interpretation of the Constitution based on ‘a 
superficial reading of selected provision’ in 
favour  of ‘a more profound investigation of 
the underlying principles animating the whole 
of the Constitution’. Four such principles - 
federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and 
the rule of law, and respect for minorities – 
were identified and used in analysis of the 
rights of Quebec.
By contrast, the Fiji High Court sought to 
use the purposive approach to reject what it 
called a ‘textual analysis’ of the President’s 
powers in favour of finding previously 
unidentified presidential powers outside the 
Constitution, without reference to the aims 
of the Constitution – of either the sections 
concerning relevant presidential powers, or 
of the Constitution as a whole. By ignoring 
the intention of the constitution-makers, the 
Court in fact rejected the purposive approach 
as expounded by a range of judicial authorities 
elsewhere.
The Purposive Approach in the Fiji 
Constitution
The purposive approach as outlined is 
stated clearly in section 3 of the Constitution, 
the terms of which are set out in the 
comments by Graham Leung elsewhere in 
this publication. Of particular importance 
are the directions in section 3 to look to the 
purpose or object of any provision being 
interpreted, and to have regard to both the 
spirit of the Constitution as a whole and the 
context in which it was drafted. 
In addition, section 7 requires any court 
interpreting the Constitution to consider 
the principles stated in the ‘Compact’ in 
section 6 (unless they are irrelevant). Several 
aspects of the ‘Compact’ would be relevant 
to considering whether the President has 
powers to authorize the overthrow of an 
elected government, including principles 
about the formation of government that 
has support of a majority in the House of 
Courts and Coups in Fiji: The 2008 High Court Judgement in Qarase v Bainimarama
14
Representatives, the equitable sharing of 
political power, etc.
It is surprising that despite its purported 
reliance on the ‘purposive approach’ the 
Court made no reference to sections 3, 
6 and 7. In many other Fiji constitutional 
decisions, those sections are relied upon.3  In 
this case, consideration of the requirements 
of section 3, in particular – the objects of 
the sections being considered, the spirit of 
the Constitution, and the context in which it 
was drafted – would have taken the court in 
analytical directions very different from those 
that underpin the judgment.
Politics of the Constitution and 
Constitutional Measures Aimed at 
Avoiding Coups
Issues about the aims, spirit and context 
of the Constitution must be considered in the 
light of the fact that it was made in part with a 
view to avoiding constitutional instability and 
coups. In the mid-1990s, after experience 
of division and conflict that had given rise to 
two coups in 1987, abrogation of the 1970 
Constitution, and the making of the unbalanced 
1990 Constitution, Fiji’s political leaders 
agreed to develop a new constitution. The 
task of developing the proposals was given 
to the Fiji Constitution Review Commission 
(FCRC), which developed recommendations 
directed towards minimizing sources of 
conflict and increasing the likelihood of future 
constitutional stability (Fiji1996). In doing so, 
the FCRC drew upon constitution-making 
experience in other countries that had 
experienced similar constitutional instability.
Constitutions are of course the products 
of political and economic forces, but are at 
the same time intended to place limits on 
political action, for example by providing the 
framework within which major tensions and 
divisions are managed, and placing limits 
on state action. In countries where political 
and economic forces are relatively stable, 
there are seldom pressures to step outside 
the constitutional framework. But in countries 
with unstable political and economic forces, 
including deep ethnic divisions, constitutional 
instability has been common, especially in 
some post-colonial states. 
When the first post-independence 
constitutions were being made for such states, 
attention was seldom given to the possibility 
of either the constitution-making process or 
the contents of the constitutions reducing the 
risk of constitutional instability and coups. 
In terms of process, constitutions were 
largely the product of elite negotiation, often 
conducted in the metropolis of the colonial 
power. In terms of content, other than such 
developments as inclusion of enforceable bills 
of rights and some constitutional protection 
for the independence of officials carrying 
out politically sensitive roles (e.g. electoral 
commission members)4, constitutions tended 
to be modelled on those of the departing 
colonial power. As they were largely stable 
in their places of origin, it was expected 
there would be similar outcomes in the post-
colonial context.
The wave of constitution-making since 
the late 1980s has seen the adoption of 
approaches to both constitution-making 
process and constitutional content intended 
to reduce risks of instability and coups. 
Constitution-making processes have 
increasingly become either highly participatory 
(as, for example, in the cases of Uganda’s 
1995 Constitution, and South Africa’s post 
apartheid constitutions), or, where they are 
still the products of elite negotiation, have 
been more open and transparent than was 
the case with the decolonization constitutions 
and have sought to involve minorities. 
Amongst the key goals of such processes 
have been the incorporation of major groups 
into the state and nation, ensuring that the 
structures and mechanisms included in the 
constitution are as widely acceptable as 
possible, and increasing the legitimacy of the 
constitution produced by the process.
In terms of content, aspects of constitutional 
design in divided and ‘post-conflict’ situations 
are often directed towards reduction of conflict 
and increasing constitutional stability. They 
include power-sharing devices designed to 
reduce sources of division (electoral systems, 
power-sharing in the national executive, 
territorial power-sharing etc.). 
In addition many constitutions incorporate 
other approaches intended to contribute to 
constitutional stability, two of which require 
brief comment. One involves imposition of 
clear limits on the powers of the executive. The 
second involves spreading power amongst 
many independent authorities, beyond 
what have traditionally been seen as the 
three main arms of government (legislature, 
executive and judiciary) – generally to bodies 
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responsible for the integrity of government 
institutions and processes, including human 
rights commissions, ombudsman bodies, 
auditors general and so on. They are intended 
to act as checks on the executive (and other 
main arms of government), thereby helping 
to keep government as a whole accountable, 
minimizing the dangers of abuse, or 
concentration of, power in institutions under 
the control or influence of one or another 
group. It is an approach that goes far beyond 
the long-established doctrine of separation of 
powers, under which the three main arms of 
government act as checks on one another. 
Some of these approaches are evident 
in both the processes used in the making 
and the contents of the Fiji Constitution, and 
should have been taken into account by the 
Court when considering whether it could 
have been intended by the constitution-
makers that in some circumstances a 
President could have wide powers outside 
the Constitution, enabling the overriding 
of critically constitutional arrangements. 
Such an intention seems most unlikely in 
a situation where a significant goal of the 
constitution-making process was to recover 
from a situation of constitutional instability.
Aims, Spirit, and Context of the Fiji 
Constitution
I turn now to brief consideration of the 
application to this case of the three aspects 
of the requirements of the approach to 
interpretation of the Constitution embodied in 
section 3 of the Constitution.
Context in which the Constitution was 
drafted:
The Constitution was drafted in an 
attempt to resolve conflict and to reduce the 
likelihood of a resumption of constitutional 
instability and coups. It was made through 
a consultative process, involving a mix of 
elite negotiation and public participation, 
all intended to ensure broad acceptability 
and legitimacy of the ultimate constitution. 
It was intended to represent an agreement 
between previously divided groups about 
how to share power and work together, an 
agreement in large part represented in the 
‘Compact’ in section 6. The resulting long and 
detailed Constitution was clearly intended 
to be a reasonably comprehensive set of 
provisions in part directed to avoiding coups. 
In these circumstances, the notion that there 
might be a significant set of powers for the 
President located outside the framework of 
the Constitution seems most unlikely.
Spirit of the Constitution:
In addition to representing an agreement 
between once divided groups, the Constitution 
seeks to reduce sources of conflict (e.g. 
through electoral and power-sharing 
arrangements) and to offer protection and 
the possibility of participation in government 
to all communities, including minorities. Like 
many other ‘democratising’ and ‘post-conflict’ 
constitutions in post-colonial states, it seeks 
to limit executive powers, most notably by 
clearly delineating the powers of different 
elements of the executive (including those 
of President, Prime Minister, Cabinet and 
Ministers), and by human rights provision 
and strong accountability provisions. The 
latter include provision for scrutiny of the 
executive by the legislature, an Ombudsman 
with extensive powers, and a code of conduct 
for leaders. Further highly independent 
new constitutional centres of authority are 
created, including the Ombudsman, Auditor-
General, Director of Public Prosecutions, and 
Electoral and Human Rights Commissions 
(section 169). 
Where a constitution goes to such lengths 
to delineate and limit the powers of the 
executive,  to spread government authority 
amongst numerous centres of power, and to 
ensure that the executive is accountable to 
other institutions, it would seem most unlikely 
that the head of the executive could have 
been intended to have additional sources of 
powers enabling concentration of power in 
an office effectively made unaccountable. 
If a court were to follow the example of 
the Canadian Supreme Court in Reference 
re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R.217, 
and identify for Fiji ‘underlying principles 
animating the whole of the Constitution’, they 
might include:
a high level of accountability of government, •	
especially the executive arm;
spread of power amongst a number of •	
constitutional offices all independent of 
the executive;
protection of all communities, including •	
minorities;
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reducing sources of conflict between •	
communities;
a compact between major groups;•	
overall, a goal of achieving constitutional •	
stability and avoiding further coups.
Such principles would be quite inconsistent 
with the reasoning in the judgment.
Purpose or Object Underlying the Specific 
Provisions Being Interpreted:
The main provisions of the Constitution 
relevant to the Court’s analysis were those:
establishing the President’s office •	
(section 85) and stating the President’s 
roles as Head of State (section 86) and 
Commander in Chief (section 87);
stating the President’s powers on •	
appointment and dismissal of the Prime 
Minister (sections 98, 107, 108 and 109); 
and 
requiring that, with limited exceptions, •	
the President must act on advice (section 
96).
On a proper reading of section 3 of the 
Constitution, a key question for the Court 
should have been whether these provisions 
themselves contain any indications as 
to an intention that the President should 
derive powers from sources outside the 
Constitution.
Before examining the text of the sections, 
an important starting point when considering 
the purpose or object underlying particular 
provisions can be the key documents 
generated by the constitution-making process, 
such as the Report of the FCRC, or the 
records of debate in the Parliament on the 
draft Constitution. Some constitutions require 
a court interpreting a constitutional provision 
to make reference to such records in all 
cases except where they are found to have no 
relevance, an example being section 24 of the 
Papua New Guinea Constitution.5 Although 
that is not the case with the Fiji Constitution, 
there seems no reason why, when seeking to 
understand the ‘purpose or object underlying 
the provision’ being considered, and having 
regard to both the spirit of the Constitution as 
a whole and the circumstances in which it was 
drafted, that the court would not consider such 
records. In a number of judgments of both the 
Supreme Court of Fiji Islands and the Court of 
Appeal of the Fiji Islands reference has been 
made to such documents.6
Amongst relevant portions of the Report are 
some that suggest that the Court should have 
been cautious in assuming that prerogative 
powers were intended to be preserved. In 
the discussion of sources of law that fill gaps 
in a constitution, the FCRC acknowledged 
the importance of the common law in guiding 
courts in constitutional interpretation, but 
made no suggestion that the common law 
(which is the source of prerogative powers) 
could override the constitution (Fiji 1996:28-
9). In its discussion of emergency powers, 
the FCRC recognizes ‘the prerogative’ as 
one of several common law sources of power 
that the executive arm of government might 
call upon in an emergency, but cautions 
that ‘… the authority for them is vague, 
and their scope ill-defined. The exercise of 
power under them is not, in general, subject 
to safeguards.’ (Fiji 1996:637) The Report 
indicates that ‘although the Constitution 
should not expressly exclude the possible 
sources of emergency powers under the 
common law, the powers needed … to 
deal with emergencies should, in principle, 
be conferred either by Parliament or the 
Constitution’ (Fiji 1996:638).  Further, its 
recommendations on emergency powers 
envisage the President always acting on 
advice.
Careful analysis of the powers of the 
President reveals that he or she derives 
no powers from the general provisions 
of sections 86 and 87 (those making the 
President the Head of State and Commander 
of the military, respectively). They are merely 
descriptive of symbolic roles. Rather, he or 
she derives powers from numerous other 
provisions authorizing or requiring the doing 
of specific things. Most importantly, as 
provided in section 96(1), in exercising all 
those other powers, the President always 
‘acts only on the advice of the Cabinet or a 
Minister or of some other body or authority 
prescribed by the Constitution’. In other 
words, the President acts on the advice 
of the Cabinet or a Minister unless some 
other body or authority is prescribed by the 
Constitution to serve in this advisory role. 
The sole exception concerns circumstances 
where the Constitution itself permits the 
President to ‘act in his or her own judgment’ 
(section 96(2)). 
Some 25 provisions (see Table 1) provide 
a power and specify the authority upon 
whose advice the President is required to 
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act in its exercise. A further ten provisions 
(Table 2) provide powers in respect of which 
the ‘President may act in his or her own 
judgment’. There are also thirteen provisions 
(Table 3) where a power is vested in the 
President with no indication either that 
advice is required before its use, or that 
the President’s may act in his or her own 
judgment. In four of those thirteen provisions 
the Constitution states that the President 
‘must’ act (sections 46(1), 108(2), 188(1) and 
188(2)), indicating an absence of discretion. 
In the other nine instances the absence 
of any indication of a specific authority in 
accordance with whose advice the President 
must act brings section 96(1) into operation, 
meaning that the President can act only 
on the advice of the Cabinet or a Minister. 
That was the view taken in 2003 by the Fiji 
Court of Appeal in relation to section 109(1) 
in Yabaki v President of the Republic of Fiji 
Islands.7
It would seem clear then that except in the 
few instances listed in the Constitution where 
the President can act ‘in his or her own 
judgment’, he or she is otherwise required 
always to act on advice. In a decision of 
the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea 
concerning the powers of the Governor-
General of that country, who is required 
always to act on and in accordance with 
advice, it was held that the Governor General 
acts as the ‘rubber stamp’ of the Cabinet or 
other authority in accordance with whose 
advice he or she must act (Kila Wari and 
Ors v Ramoi and Dibela [1986] PNGLR 
112).  There is no reason to suppose that the 
President of Fiji is any less a ‘rubber stamp’ 
in the situations where he or she is required 
to act on advice. An office of President that in 
most instances is a ‘rubber stamp’ for another 
authority is essentially a ceremonial position, 
with just a few ‘reserve powers’, each of them 
carefully specified by the Constitution itself 
(those where the President’s own judgment 
applies).
Where such care has been taken by 
constitution-makers to enumerate the powers 
of the President, and to limit severely the 
circumstances where he or she acts other 
than on advice, it would seem remarkable 
that the same constitution-makers would 
have envisaged the President being vested 
with any additional powers. The scheme of 
the Constitution militates against any such 
interpretation, for although the President is 
notionally vested with executive authority, in 
terms of actual powers he or she is clearly 
intended to be just one authority amongst 
many, with just the specific powers assigned 
to the office. The President is not intended to 
be in some way superior to other authorities 
created by the Constitution – yet this would 
be the result of the President being vested 
with prerogative powers.
Concluding Comments
The judgment in Qarase v Bainimarama 
vests the President with almost unlimited 
powers to take over government at his 
discretion, and to then take whatever action 
he or she believes is needed, with no form 
of review or accountability possible.8 The 
judgment is based on a flawed analysis 
of the Constitution. Amongst other things, 
it misinterprets the purposive approach to 
constitutional interpretation, failing to follow 
the approach to interpretation required by 
sections 3, 6 and 7 of the Constitution, despite 
many precedents in previous Supreme Court 
and Court of Appeal judgments that have 
relied upon those sections. The judgment 
permits the holder of an unelected and 
largely ceremonial office, with strictly limited 
powers, to override the Constitution and to 
concentrate powers either in that office or in 
an office of Interim Prime Minister created 
and occupied by the use of force. It clothes 
such actions in constitutional legitimacy, and 
purports to free both the President and all 
of those involved in the taking of power by 
force from any form of accountability for 
their actions. It is a judgment that permits 
the manipulation of a pliant Head of State 
by a person wishing to take power by the 
use of force. It is a judgment that provides a 
dangerous precedent in other states where 
common law prerogatives might be used to 
justify the overriding of the constitution.
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Section Power of the President Authority on Whose Advice the 
President Must Act
s.42(4) Appointment  of members of Human 
Rights Commission
The Prime Minister after consultation with 
the Leader of the Opposition and relevant 
sector standing committee of the House of 
Representatives
s.60(1) Issue of writs for the election of the members 
of the House of Representatives
The Prime Minister
s.64(1) Appointment of members of the Senate In respect of 14, the Bose Levu Vakaturaga•	
In respect of 9, the Prime Minister•	
In respect of 8, the Leader of the •	
Opposition
In respect of 1, the Council of Rotuma•	
s.68(1) Summoning meeting of Parliament 
following a general election
The Prime Minister
s.68(2) Summoning meetings of Parliament other 
than immediately after a general election
The Prime Minister
s.76(4) Appointment of two members of the 
Constituency Boundaries Commission 
other than the chairperson
One on nomination of the Prime Minister and 
one on the nomination of the Leader of the 
Opposition
s.78(8) Appointment of four members of the 
Electoral Commission other than the 
chairperson
The Prime Minister following consultation with 
the Leader of the Opposition
s.83(5) Appointment of the chairperson and two 
other members of the Parliamentary 
Emoluments Commission
The relevant sector standing committee of the 
House of Representatives
s.99(1) Appointment and dismissal of Ministers 
other than the Prime Minister
The Prime Minister
s.100(4) 
& s.99(1)
Where the Attorney-General is for any 
reason unable to perform the functions of 
the office, appointment of another Minister 
or Member of the Parliament to act as 
Attorney-General
Attorney-General is a Minister, appointment 
of an acting Attorney-General is subject to the 
provisions of s.99(1) even though no mention 
of advice of the Prime Minister is made in 
s.100(4))
s.103(2) Assignment of responsibilities to 
Ministers
The Prime Minister
s.112(2) Appointment of the Commander of the 
RFMF
The Minister
s.115(3) Grant of pardons, conditional pardons, 
etc.
The Commission on the Prerogative of Mercy
s.123 Referring to the Supreme Court for its 
opinion a question as to the effect of a 
provision of the Constitution
The Cabinet
s.132(1) Appointment of the Chief Justice The Prime Minister
s.132(2) Appointment of judges of the Supreme 
Court, Justices of Appeal, and the puisne 
judges of the High Court
The Judicial Service Commission following 
consultation with the Minister and the relevant 
sector standing committee of the House of 
Representatives
Table 1
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT TO ACT ON ADvICE OF AN AUTHORITY 
PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 
(SECTION 96(1))
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Section Power of the President Authority on Whose Advice the 
President Must Act
s.132(3) Appointment of a judge as acting Chief 
Justice
The Judicial Service Commission following 
consultation with the Minister
s.138(3)
(c)
Removal of judge from office for 
misbehaviour or for inability to perform 
the functions of office
In case of misbehaviour, a tribunal established 
under s.138(3)(a)(i), and in case of inability to 
perform functions of office, a medical board 
appointed under s.138(3)(a)(ii)
s.143(4) Appointments of chairpersons and 
members of the independent service 
commissions – namely, the Constitutional 
Offices Commission, the Public Services 
Commission, and the Disciplined Services 
Commission
Nomination of the Minister after approval by 
the appropriate sector standing committee of 
the House of Representatives
s.144(2) Appointment of acting member of an 
independent service commission when 
substantive member absent from Fiji or 
unable to perform functions of office
The Prime Minister following consultation with 
the Leader of the Opposition
s.149(1) 
& (2)
Appointment to or removal from offices 
of ambassador or other principal 
representative of Fiji to another country or 
an international organization
The Prime Minister
s.172(4) 
& (6)
Initiating process for, and exercising 
power of, removal from office of certain 
constitutional office-holders
The Prime Minister following consultation with 
the Leader of the Opposition
s.185(3) Assent to Bill for an Act altering particular 
laws
Certification by the Secretary General to 
Parliament that prescribed procedures for 
parliamentary assent have been adhered to
s.187(1) Proclamation of a state of emergency The Cabinet (subject to the Parliament first 
making a law conferring such a power on the 
President)
s.188(4) Proclaiming an extension of the term of 
the House of Representatives if the term 
would expire during a state of emergency
The Cabinet
Table 1 cont.
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Section Power of the President Formulation of the Power
s.68(3) Summonsing the Parliament to meet 
when the Parliament is not in session and 
the President has received a request in 
writing from at least 18 members seeking 
consideration without delay of a matter of 
public importance
The President ‘acting in his or her own 
judgment’  
s.76(3) Appointment of chairperson of 
Constituency Boundaries Commission
The President ‘acting in his or her own 
judgment, following consultation with the Prime 
Minister and the Leader of the Opposition’
s.78(7) Appointment of the chairperson of the 
Electoral Commission
The President ‘acting in his or her own 
judgment’
s.82(1), 
(2), & (8) 
Appointment of the Leader of the 
Opposition
The President ‘acts in his or her own judgment’ 
in exercising a power to appoint the member 
of the House who ‘would, in the opinion of the 
President’, be acceptable as Leader
s.82(3) & 
(8)
Termination of the appointment and 
replacement of the Leader of the 
Opposition
The President ‘acts in his or her own 
judgment’
s.82(6) & 
(8)
Determining that an appointment of 
Leader of the Opposition cannot be made, 
thereby enabling the President to make 
certain appointments and take certain 
actions without reference to the Leader of 
the Opposition
The President ‘acts in his or her own 
judgment’
s.98 Appointment of the Prime Minister The President ‘acting in his or her own 
judgment’
s.108(1) In a situation where a Prime Minister (PM) 
who has lost the confidence of the House 
of Representatives advises a dissolution 
of the House: 
•	ascertaining	whether	 or	 not	 there	 is	 an	
alternative PM – i.e. another person who 
can get the confidence of the House; 
and 
•	if	 an	 alternative	 PM	 exists,	 ask	 the	
defeated PM to resign, or (if the PM 
refuses to resign) dismiss him or her and 
appoint the alternative PM); and
•	if	 unable	 to	 ascertain	 existence	 of	 an	
alternative PM, grant the dissolution 
advised by the defeated PM
The President ‘acting in his or her own 
judgment’
s.109(2) Where the President has dismissed a 
Prime Minister, appointment of a caretaker 
Prime Minister to advise a dissolution of 
the Parliament
The President ‘acting in his or her own 
judgment’
s.115(2)
(b)
Appointment of two members (other than 
the chairperson) of the Commission on 
the Prerogative of Mercy
The President ‘acting in his or her own 
judgment’
Table 2
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT TO ACT IN HIS OR HER OWN JUDGMENT 
(CONSTITUTION SECTION 96(2))
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Table 3
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT TO ACT WHERE THE CONSTITUTION DOES 
NOT SPECIFY A BODY OR AUTHORITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHOSE 
ADvICE HE OR SHE MUST ACT
Section Power of the President Limitations, Restrictions etc. Inherent 
in Formulation of Power
S.46(1) Assent to Bills passed by both Houses s.46(2) states that the President ‘must not 
refuse to assent to a Bill duly presented for his 
or her assent’ upon decision by both Houses
s.92(1) Nomination of a person as Vice-President 
in circumstances where there is a vacancy 
in the office of Vice-President
None stated
s.104 Requesting Prime Minister for information 
concerning matters relating to the 
governance of Fiji
None stated
s.108(2) Where, after a Prime Minister (PM) has 
lost the confidence of the House and an 
alternative PM is appointed who fails to get 
the confidence of the House,  dismissal of 
the alternative PM, re-appointment of the 
previous PM and grant of the dissolution 
originally advised by the previous PM
The section provides that the President ‘must’ 
take the actions specified
S109(1) Dismissal of a Prime Minister (PM) where 
the Government fails to get or loses the 
confidence of the House and the PM does 
not resign or get a dissolution
None stated. However, this section seems 
intended mainly to restate requirements of 
ss.107 and 108. To the extent that it does 
more than that, the Court of Appeal of Fiji 
has held that the power must be exercised on 
the advice of the Cabinet or a Minister - see 
Yabaki v President of the Republic of the Fiji 
Islands
s.138(3)
(a)
In circumstances where the President 
considers that the question of removing a 
judge from office ought to be considered, 
initiation of the process of removal of a 
judge, by appointing (in case of alleged 
misbehaviour) a tribunal, or (in case of 
alleged inability to perform the functions 
of office) a medical board
None stated
s.138(4) Suspension from office of a judge in 
respect of whom the question of removal 
from office has been referred to a tribunal 
or medical board
None stated
148(1)(a) Decision on whether or not to agree 
with the Public Service Commission on 
appointment of a person to, removal of a 
person from or the taking of disciplinary 
action against the holder of an office 
under the control of the President
None stated
s.185(3) Assent to Bills altering certain laws (e.g. 
Fijian Affairs Act)
In addition to the normal requirements of 
s.46(1) as to the assent of both Houses, the 
President ‘must not assent to a Bill referred 
to in this section unless it is accompanied by 
a certificate of the Secretary-General to the 
Parliament’ certifying that other procedural 
and voting majority requirements have been 
met
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ENDNOTES
Unreported, Fiji High Court, 9 October 1. 
2008. The Court consisted of three 
members – Gates ACJ, and Byrne and 
Pathik JJ.
The Court does hold that laws so 2. 
made will be subject to review by the 
‘incoming Parliament’ (p.46) yet to be 
elected, thereby offering the one hope 
of some accountability in this exercise. 
However, as the Constitution can be 
amended by Promulgation, it is yet to be 
established whether the new Parliament 
will be freely and fairly elected and truly 
representative. 
See, for example, the Court of Appeal in 3. 
Chaudhry v Qarase [2002] FJCA 3; MISC 
NO.1 2001 (15 February 2002), and the 
Supreme Court in Qarase v Chaudhry 
[2003] FJSC 1; CBV0004.2002S (18 July 
2003).
De Smith (1964:136) described these as 4. 
‘politically neutral zones’. 
For a discussion of the aims and operation 5. 
of that section see Regan and Wolfers 
1986.
See, for example, the judgments referred 6. 
to in footnote 3.
CJA 3, from http://www.paclii.org/7. 
cgi-bin/disp.pl/fj/cases/FJCA/2003/3.
html?query=yabaki (access 20/10/2008) 
at page 13.
Other than possible review of legislation 8. 
made by Promulgation – see footnote 2.
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Section Power of the President Limitations, Restrictions etc. Inherent 
in Formulation of Power
s.187(2) To the extent provided by a law on states 
of emergency (made under s.187(1), 
making regulations relating to a state of 
emergency
None stated
s.188(1) Summonsing the House of Representatives 
to meet upon proclamation of a state of 
emergency
The President ‘must’ summons the House to 
meet
s.188(2) The power to summons the House under 
s.188(1) extends to the period following 
dissolution of the House and before the 
next general election is held
The President ‘must’ summons the House
s.193(3) Power to proclaim a date earlier than 
27/07/98 for the date of the commencement 
of the Constitution
None stated
Table 3 cont.
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THE CONTExT & 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
OCTOBER 2008 QARASE vS 
BAINIMARAMA HIGH COURT 
RULING
Jon Fraenkel
On 9th October, Fiji’s High Court ruled 
that the President’s actions in appointing 
an interim cabinet in January 2007, and in 
continuing to rule by decree in the wake of 
Fiji’s December 5th 2006 coup, ‘were valid 
and are held to be lawful’. The three-member 
High Court panel, led by acting Chief Justice 
Anthony Gates, drew the conclusion that 
‘exceptional circumstances existed’, because 
‘the stability of the State was endangered’, 
so the President was entitled to use certain 
‘prerogative powers’ not provided for in the 
constitution (Qarase v Bainimarama 2008). 
The decision had, as it was clearly intended 
to do, the effect of legitimising the post-coup 
interim order. 
It is worth considering the context of the 
Qarase v Bainimarama ruling.
The High Court’s judgment came as a shock 
to many in Fiji. Despite some controversies 
associated with judicial reaction to the 2000 
coup, people in Fiji had grown accustomed to 
the courts seeming to be largely independent 
of political influence, reasonably dependable 
and held in high public esteem. Indeed, an 
extraordinary veneration came to exist for the 
rule of law in Fiji, paradoxically considerably 
greater than that respect which exists for 
constitutional democracy. After the failed 
George Speight putsch in May 2000, Fiji’s 
courts ruled the post-coup interim regime led 
by Laisenia Qarase to be illegal. First in the 
Lautoka High Court, presided over by the 
now acting Chief Justice Anthony Gates, and 
then in the Chandrika Prasad case before 
the Court of Appeal in 2001, judges found 
the 1997 constitution intact and ordered a 
speedy return to democratic rule. By contrast, 
other parts of the world, such as Nigeria 
and Pakistan, have considerably greater 
familiarity with court judgments that have 
aimed to legitimise post-coup governments. 
The Fiji experience was also unusual in 
another way. In the 2001 Chandrika Prasad 
judgment, the Court said ‘to its credit, the 
Interim Civilian Government in this case has 
adopted a very responsible stance’, making 
clear that ‘in the event of the 1997 Constitution 
being upheld by the Courts, it would use its 
best endeavours to promote a return to 
constitutional legality’ (Court of Appeal 2001). 
This proved a solid commitment. In the wake 
of that judgment, the President had to be 
re-elected by the Great Council of Chiefs and 
Fiji returned to the polls. In other parts of the 
world, regimes that arose in the aftermath of 
coups have been much more likely to defy 
such decisions from the courts.  
The 2001 Chandrika Prasad case was not 
the last of Fiji’s high profile court judgments 
regarding the constitutionality of the Qarase-
led government. Following that case, interim 
Prime Minister Qarase proved able to win 
the consequent election, and form a majority 
government. But this government too was 
found to be unconstitutional, on the grounds 
that it had failed to follow constitutional 
provisions requiring all parties with more 
than 10% of seats to participate in cabinet 
(Court of Appeal 2002, 2003, Supreme Court 
2004). Initially, the government contested 
the ruling, and when this was upheld, it 
sought to conform to the letter but not 
the spirit of the law by offering the Fiji 
Labour Party powerless token ministries, 
which were eventually refused. Yet, after a 
further election in May 2006, which returned 
Qarase’s Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua 
to office, the Prime Minister formed a multi-
party cabinet that included leading members 
of the previously excluded Fiji Labour 
Party, as required by the constitution. The 
portfolios – including labour, agriculture and 
health – were substantial. It was a fraught 
arrangement, largely because the Fiji Labour 
Party leader Mahendra Chaudhry preferred 
to remain outside cabinet, and the set-up 
was ultimately destroyed by the military coup 
of December 5th 2006. Nevertheless, this 
was the first time since independence that 
political leaders from Fiji’s two major political 
parties - the one representing the now 57% 
ethnic Fijians and the other representing 
the 37% Indo-Fijians - had attempted to 
cooperate in cabinet. It was a promising if 
stillborn experiment.
In other words, as regards the two major 
constitutional issues brought before the 
courts during 2000-2006, judges in both 
cases found the Qarase government to be 
illegal. In both cases, that government - 
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eventually - accepted the court’s verdict, and 
reconstructed itself accordingly. Yet now, 
when that government has been illegally 
ousted from office by the Fiji Military Forces 
and looks to the courts for protection, far 
from finding that usurpation of power and 
the subsequent presidential decrees to be 
unlawful, the courts instead have ruled in 
such a way as to legitimise the post-coup 
interim order. The ‘stability of the State’ was 
said to have been endangered, justifying the 
President’s use of extraordinary ‘prerogative 
powers’ not provided for in the constitution. 
No consideration was given to the fact 
that the source of that instability was the 
Commander of the RFMF himself, who as 
a result of the exercise of these prerogative 
powers was himself made Prime Minister. It 
is a deeply flawed judgment; one that is likely 
to have long-term negative repercussions for 
the respect in which the courts have been 
held in Fiji. 
Unfortunately, there can be little 
expectation that Fiji’s Court of Appeal or 
Supreme Court will reverse the High Court’s 
judgment. Fiji’s judiciary has been thoroughly 
reshaped since the 2006 coup. First, the Chief 
Justice Daniel Fatiaki was controversially 
‘suspended’ in January 2007, and Justice 
Gates appointed as acting chief justice under 
circumstances widely interpreted to have 
been illegal (see, for example, Crawford, 
2007). The President of the Court of Appeal, 
Gordon Ward, refused to accept renewal 
of appointment under the new order. His 
house in Pacific Harbour was burnt to the 
ground in suspicious circumstances. The 
six remaining expatriate judges on Fiji’s 
Court of Appeal resigned in September 2007, 
saying that it was apparent that their services 
were not wanted. Former Fiji Supreme Court 
judge, Robert French – now Chief Justice in 
Australia – writing in The Australian explained 
the reasons for his declining any renewal of 
appointment on the Supreme Court of Fiji, 
stating that to do so would entail an ‘implicit 
bargain’ with the interim government and 
that ‘when faced with a challenge to the 
lawfulness of the government itself, such 
a judge could be seen to have a conflict of 
interest’ (The Australian, 2 May 2008). High 
Court judge, Justice Gerard Winter similarly 
decided, as he put it, that ‘I could not renew 
my warrant in 2008 if the military regime was 
still in power as to do so would run contrary 
to my original oath of office’ (The Australian 
15 August 2008). 
There are several other Australian judges, 
who took their commissions from an elected 
government, who are still sitting on the 
Supreme Court, but their appointments expire 
before the end of the year or in early 2009. 
Clearly, the extraordinary delay - from March 
to October 2008 – before the announcement 
of the verdict in Qarase v Bainimarama 
has contributed to the probability that these 
remaining judges will be unable to hear any 
appeal in the Qarase v Bainimarama  case, 
should this reach the Supreme Court. Those 
that sit on the benches of Fiji’s courts will, by 
then, be almost exclusively judges who have 
accepted appointments under the interim 
order, or local judges who may, for obvious 
reasons, find greater difficulty ruling in such 
a way as to contest the authority of the post-
coup government. The right course for the 
deposed government is surely to appeal 
to the higher courts, but the likelihood of a 
satisfactory outcome – this side of a general 
election – seems slender. 
Some in Fiji had hoped, understandably 
if perhaps naively, that Justice Gates in 
particular would rule the interim government 
illegal and pave a way for the restoration of 
constitutional democracy. That, after all, would 
have been in accord with his statement, in the 
November 2000 ruling in Chandrika Prasad v 
the State (Lautoka High Court 2000) that ‘a 
judge’s first duty is to uphold the Constitution’, 
and his comment, in the same case, that ‘it is 
not the oath taken or the regime under which 
an appointment is made that colour a judge’s 
role on legitimacy. A judge is expected to act 
at all times impartially, fairly, with integrity, 
and to uphold all the laws of the land, 
independently of the regime existing at the 
time of his or her appointment’. It was for that 
2000 decision that Justice Gates became 
celebrated by Commonwealth legal scholars 
as a founder of the ‘new jurisprudence’ on 
coups, and credited with having put forward 
new doctrine potentially with “canonical” 
authority that might replace the so-called 
‘dodgy jurisprudence’ developed in coup-
prone countries like Pakistan and Nigeria 
(Hatchard & Ogowewo 2003, p23). Alas, 
that courage to stand up to a post-coup 
government and pronounce it to be illegal 
was not to be repeated in the verdict on the 
Qarase v Bainimarama case. 
Instead, Justice Gates’ and his colleagues 
made a ruling that ‘prerogative powers’ exist 
that are not found in the 1997 constitution. 
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Shugart, 1997). Since the President is also 
not popularly elected in Fiji, so increasing his 
or her powers is all the more dangerous. In 
other words, the ‘coup to end all coups’ has 
now written for itself a charter for all future 
coups. 
Where does the Qarase v Bainimarama 
judgment leave Fiji? Clearly, those many 
people in Fiji who have been removed from 
their positions or suffered economically as 
a result of that coup cannot expect redress 
from the courts. The regime’s position, in this 
sense, would appear to be strengthened. 
Yet we should remember that the post-
2000 pattern of legal redress in Fiji was, 
internationally, highly unusual. More usually, 
what proves more important to bringing 
military regimes to an end is the corrosive 
impact of lack of internal legitimacy and 
absence of international support (Finer 1962). 
Both these factors helped Fiji - eventually – 
back to democracy and indeed towards a 
new, more broadly acceptable, constitution 
after 1990. 
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